The Federal Reserve Greenbook forecasts of real GDP, in ‡ation and unemployment are analysed for the period 1974 to 1997. We consider whether these forecasts exhibit systematic bias, and whether e¢ cient use is made of information, that is, whether revisions to these forecasts over time are predictable. Rather than analyse the forecasts separately for each horizon of interest, we discuss and implement methods that pool information over horizons.
Introduction
In setting monetary policy, decision makers pay close attention to forecasts about the future state of the economy. These forecasts are one of the many inputs that decision makers use in determining whether changes in monetary policy are required. This is one of the reasons why many studies have analyzed the forecasts made by the sta¤ of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve in preparation for the meetings of the Open Market Committee. These forecasts are published in the Greenbook, the data and analytic notebook that is prepared for the Open Market Committee prior to each meeting. These meetings occur several times each quarter.
The sta¤ predict GDP, its components, various price indices, unemployment, etc. for one to eight quarters ahead. A number of studies have examined the accuracy and rationality of these forecasts, focusing primarily on the predictions of real and nominal GDP growth rates, in ‡ation rates and unemployment. For example, Karamouzis and Lombra (1989) concluded that the 1973-82 forecasts displayed large errors and contained unexploited information. Scotese (1994) found no signi…cant biases in either the real GNP or in ‡ation forecasts, but she noted that the forecast revisions had been smoothed. The studies by Kishnan (1996, 1999) and Joutz and Stekler (2000) all showed that the in ‡ation forecasts were unbiased but that there was a question whether the real GDP predictions were also unbiased. The Romer and Romer (2000) and Sims (2002) studies were primarily concerned with the accuracy of the Fed's in ‡ation forecasts. While the rationality of those forecasts was not the primary concern of those studies, both papers found no signi…cant biases in those forecasts. While there may be slight di¤erences in some of the results, the overall conclusion of these studies is that these forecasts are unbiased. Moreover, all these papers were based on the Mincer-Zarnowitz (1969) procedure.
The approaches used in these studies compared the forecasts and outcomes separately for each horizon. A new procedure developed by Lahiri (1995, 1999) , following on from Keane and Runkle (1990) , permits us to pool the forecasts for each variable across all horizons. 1 This has a number of advantages. It is natural to consider all the forecasts together and ask whether they are biased, rather than asking the question separately of each individual horizon.
A …nding that j-step forecasts are biased, while the j + 1 step forecasts are not biased, for example, is di¢ cult to interpret. Moreover, if we test a number of sets of forecasts then the chances of rejecting the null for at least one set (horizon) will exceed the nominal test level.
Utilising all the forecasts in a single test should also make for a more powerful test of the null of unbiasedness, where the forecasts of rational agents (with squared-error loss functions 2 ) should be unbiased at all horizons.
Techniques for testing for the e¢ cient use of information were discussed in the context of …xed-event forecasts by Nordhaus (1987) and Clements (1995 Clements ( , 1997 . Nordhaus (1987) examined the forecasts for a single target date using a large number of forecasts of that target made at varying times (and so with di¤erent horizons). Clements (1997) considered pooling over a small number of targets. We adapt these ideas to our set up, where we have a large number of targets but relatively few forecasts of each, and also calculate pooled versions of these tests. We show that if we assume the forecast-error decomposition of Davies and Lahiri (1995) , the test based on the lack of correlation on adjacent forecast revisions of Nordhaus is invalid. Instead, we present versions which are valid under the Davies-Lahiri setup.
In section 2 we brie ‡y review the standard approaches for testing for bias, where each horizon is analyzed separately, and then outline the pooling procedure. Section 3 sets out the approach we adopt for analyzing forecast revisions. This enables us to examine the forecast smoothing issue raised by Scotese. Namely that forecasters are averse to making large and/or frequent changes to their subsequent forecasts for the same target. Section 4 explains the structure of the forecasts at our disposal, that is, the nature of the FED forecast data set, as well as the results of our assessment. Section 5 presents our conclusions.
Testing for forecast bias
Before we present the approach to pooling forecasts made with various leads (i.e., over di¤erent horizons), we discuss the tests that have customarily been used in testing for bias and rationality.
Traditional procedure
The conventional test for bias is based on the regression:
where A t and F th are the actual and predicted values for time t. The prediction is made at t h, and the error term is allowed to be an MA(h 1) process. The test involves the joint null hypothesis that = 0 and = 1. A rejection of this null would indicate that the forecasts are biased: see also Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) . Whilst the joint null entails unbiasedness, Holden Peel (1990) note that the null is a su¢ cient, but not a necessary, condition for unbiasedness, since unbiasedness holds for:
A more satisfactory test of unbiasedness is via a test of = 0 in the regression:
The important point is that either (1) or (3) would typically be run, and the relevant null test statistic computed, separately for each h, h = 1; 2; 3 : : :. More powerful tests may be obtained by pooling, especially when the available sample of forecasts for any given h is relatively small.
Pooling procedure
In this section we outline the procedures we adopt to test for bias based on pooling the forecasts.
Pooling across horizons requires that we posit a model of the forecast errors that enables us to infer the correlation structure across errors of di¤erent targets and lengths that is consistent with rationality. To this end, we will adopt the decomposition of forecast errors of Davies and Lahiri (1995) , except that their forecasts vary across individuals as well as targets and horizons.
For a single individual, with targets t = 1; : : : ; T , and horizons, h = 1; : : : ; H, we have:
A t F th = + th + " th :
The " th are the 'idiosyncratic shocks', and the th are the aggregate or common macroeconomic shocks. th is the sum of all shocks that occurred between t h and t, labelled as u th to u t1 :
As we discuss below, the distinguishing feature of these two shocks (or surprises) is that var (" th )
is constant over h (and t), because it is an error speci…c to the forecast of t being made at time t h. By way of contrast, var ( th ) decreases as the horizon h shortens, as th cumulates the shocks between t h and t.
The forecast error is de…ned as:
Stacking the forecasts in the T H dimension vector F as 
where v is the T H vector from stacking v th conformably with A and F, and i T H is the unit vector of dimension T H. From (7) it is clear that the bias is restricted to be the same across all horizons. This assumption can be relaxed by instead specifying the regression equation as: imposed is the same as in (7) but the alternative hypotheses di¤er. If there were systematic di¤erences in the ways in which the forecasts of di¤erent horizons were calculated, this could result in them having di¤erent biases. Consequently, the assumption of a common bias may erroneously lead to a failure to reject the null H 0 : = 0 in (7). Note that testing based on (8) is not equivalent to the standard approach of testing the forecast errors for each horizon using separate regressions. Davies and Lahiri (1995) adopt a common bias over horizons but allow individual-speci…c biases. We begin with horizon-speci…c biases, and test the assumption of a common bias over horizons.
The distinction between macro shocks ( th ) and idiosyncratic errors (" th ) is perhaps questionable when there is a single forecaster, as in our analysis of the FED. Clearly, when there is 'private information'(see Davies and Lahiri (1995, footnote 13) ), the distinction is lost. Private information leads to to the idiosyncratic error term " th in (4) being replaced by th = P h j=1 " tj , with th = P h j=1 u tj unchanged, such that as h gets smaller the variance of the private component, V ar ( th ), declines. In our case, if we think of the FED as possessing con…dential ('private') information, then although conceptually distinct from the macro shocks, it cannot be separately distinguished when it takes the form th = P h j=1 " tj (for a horizon h), as
where
say. One can motivate the formulation with idiosyncratic terms by thinking of these not so much as shocks as particular or idiosyncratic errors made by the forecaster which can include ine¢ cient use of information. Thus, the " th represent forecast errors at a particular horizon (or state of the business cycle) that the forecaster is prone to make. These may be due to forecast model misspeci…cations and/or the forecaster's own interventions.
The importance of the f" th g entering as summations ( th = P h j=1 " tj ) in the model for the forecast errors A t F th is that the variance of the (common) shock fv th g is directly proportional to h. So the practical upshot is that the stance we take on the idiosyncratic component will a¤ect the correlation structures of the forecast errors and may therefore a¤ect the outcomes of the tests of the FED forecasts. Rather than taking a view on which assumption is appropriate, we will assess the robustness of our results to these alternative assumptions about the model of the forecast error process. As a shorthand we will sometimes use E " 2 th 2 " = 0 to refer to the case where the idiosyncratic component is absent, in which case 2 u becomes the variance of the n u tj o . Otherwise, when 2 " 6 = 0, 2 u implicitly refers to var (u tj ). Based on the above, we can assume that E (v) = 0, but = E (vv 0 ) will not be proportional to the identity matrix. Allowing for idiosyncratic errors, and assuming that the " th are not correlated, E (" th " sj ) = 2 " when s = t and j = h, and zero otherwise, we obtain:
captures the fact that forecasts which have common (macroeconomic) shocks, be they of the same target, or of di¤erent targets, will be correlated. The precise form of depends on the maximum and minimum forecast lengths, etc., and will be described below. But the important point is that depends only on the single unknown variance parameter, 2 u = E u 2 t , assuming homoscedastic aggregate shocks. The assumption of homoscedastic macro shocks enables us to construct the relevant covariance matrices in sections 3 and 4 in a fairly straightforward way, but may be questionable if the U.S. economy has become less volatile since the early to mid 1980s, as argued by some (see Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000)). We …nd that the root mean square forecast error (RMSFE) of the current quarter forecast errors before and after 1985 is not markedly di¤erent, suggesting that the assumption of homoscedastic shocks may not be unreasonable.
The test of bias is based on the OLS estimator of in (7),
with the consistent covariance matrix estimator
where X = i T H . In the case of (8), we estimate a vector b H , and the covariance matrix is as (13) but with X = i T I H . To obtain a consistent standard error for OLS, needs to be replaced by an estimate b . To calculate b we require estimates of 2 u and 2 " . These can be obtained as follows. b is estimated from (12). Then b v th = e th b is the calculated deviation of each forecast error from the estimate of the bias. The variance of this term is a combination of the idiosyncratic shocks at each forecast date and the common macro shocks over time. Using in the regression:
(where is the Hadamard product, denoting element-by-element multiplication) = i T H , and 0 H = (H; H 1; : : : ; 1). Thus b ' 0 is an estimate of 2 " , the variance of idiosyncratic shocks, and b ' 1 estimates 2 u , the variance of the (homoscedastic) macro shocks. When 2 " = 0, an estimate of 2 u is given by the coe¢ cient ' 1 in the regression:
Econometric analysis of forecast revisions
After considering forecast bias, a natural question is to ask whether forecast errors are predictable from information available at the time the forecast was made. A closely related question is whether forecast revisions are predictable. Forecast errors are predictable if in the regression:
e th = x t;h+1 + + ( th + " th )
we reject the null hypothesis that = 0, where x t;h+1 is any variable known at the time the forecasts are made (it is the value of x in period t h 1). An analysis of the predictability of forecast revisions results from taking the di¤erence between adjacent forecasts errors of the same target, i.e.: e t;h+1 e th = f th f t;h+1 = (x t;h+2 x t;h+1 ) + (u t;h+1 + " t;h+1 " th ) :
This is equivalent to the forecast revision between h + 1 and h. If the forecasts are rational, the revisions should not be predictable, i.e., = 0. The advantage of testing revisions based on (17) rather than errors (based on (16)) is that we avoid the possible problem of the regressor and disturbance being correlated in (16) (see Davies and Lahiri (1995, p.217) , inter alia), and we can easily test whether the FED forecast revisions have been "smoothed"; an issue …rst addressed by Scotese (1994) .
De…ne the revision to the forecast of t between the h and h 1 step forecasts as r t;h 1;h f t;h 1 f t;h . The revision r t;h 1;h should be unpredictable given all the information known at the time f t;h is made. Otherwise it would be known in advance that f t;h 1 would be revised relative to f t;h in a way that is in part predictable. Since 'all information'is unbounded, this hypothesis can be made testable in a simple way by considering only the information set consisting of revisions to past targets fr t 1;h 1;h ; r t 2;h 1;h ; : : :g, and of past revisions for that given target fr t;h 1+i;h+i g, i = 1; 2; : : :. To keep the analysis manageable, we consider tests based on these two information sets separately. To do so, we …rst derive the correlation structures implied by the model of forecast errors discussed in section 2.2.
The information set consisting of revisions to past targets
From r t;h 1;h f t;h 1 f t;h = e t;h e t;h 1 , and recalling that e t;h = h + " t;h + P h j=1 u tj , we have:
It follows that Cov (r t;h 1;h ; r t s;h 1;h ) = 0 for all s > 0. Thus, rational forecast revisions of adjacent targets will be uncorrelated whether or not there are idiosyncratic shocks. This suggests a test of = 0 in: r t;h 1;h = r t 1;h 1;h + + ! t ; t = 2; : : : ; T ,
where is an intercept.
Under the null, ! t = r t;h 1;h , and the covariance matrix, Cov (!! 0 ) = 2 2 " + 2 u I T 1 , where ! is a vector of the T 1 disturbances, ! t . We have this diagonal form because Cov (! t ! t s ) = 0 for s 6 = 0 and var (! t ) = 2 2 " + 2 u for all t. Inference can be conducted using OLS. When there are no idiosyncratic shocks, 2 " = 0, the 2 u are re-de…ned as 2 u to be the variance of the macro and private information shocks, but this has no e¤ect on the analysis of the revisions. The covariance matrix of the disturbances remains proportional to the identity matrix. Our main focus is on revisions between forecasts of adjacent quarters. 4 As well as estimating (18) where H = 5 for our analysis. Then consider the balanced pooled regression:
where r 1 = (r 1;1;2 : : : r T 1;1;2 r 1;2;3 : : : r T 1;2;3 : : : : : : r 1;H 1;H : : : r T 1;H 1;H ), and both r and r 1 are (H 1) (T 1) vectors. Here, d = (I H 1 i T 1 ) , and = ( 1 2 : : :
so that d is a set of H 1 horizon dummies with parameter vector . This allows for horizonspeci…c biases, such that the means of the revisions between di¤erent horizons may di¤er.
For H = 5, the covariance matrix of ! has the form under the null: 
: D is as C except that the (1; 4), (2; 5), (3; 6) : : : terms are equal to 2 u (rather than the (1; 3), (2; 4), (3; 5) : : : elements). Testing is by OLS with corrected standard errors.
The information set consisting of past revisions
In the previous section we considered whether the revision to the forecast of (say) It is straightforward to establish that Cov (r t;h 1;h ; r t;h;h+1 ) = 2 " 6 = 0, so we would not expect = 0 in: r t;h 1;h = r t;h;h+1 + + ! t ; t = 1; : : : ; T ,
unless 2 " = 0. Since we do not wish to impose this restriction, instead we consider: r t;h 1;h = r t;h+1;h+2 + + ! t ; t = 1; : : : ; T ,
Thus, we consider whether the revision to the forecast of (say) Given H = 5, we test for the dependence of r t;1;2 on r t;3;4 and r t;2;3 on r t;4;5 in two ways: separately and by pooling. We again focus on …rst-order dependence. By letting r 1;2 = (r 1;1;2 : : : r T ;1;2 ) 0 and r 2;3 = (r 1;2;3 : : : r T ;2;3 ) 0 , we stack the revisions as r = r 0 1;2 r 0 2;3 0 , where in the pooled regression:
we now have r 1 = (r 1;3;4 : : : r T ;3;4 ; r 1;4;5 : : : r T ;4;5 ). Both r and r 1 are 2 T vectors. In this regression, d = (I 2 i T ) , and = ( 1 2 ) 0 , to again allow for horizon speci…c biases.
The covariance matrix of ! has the form under the null:
where A = 2 2 " + 2 u I T , and B is de…ned in the previous sub-section.
Data set and results
Our FED forecast set contains a number of forecasts of three variables: real GDP, in ‡ation as measured by the GDP de ‡ator, and unemployment. These forecasts were made for each quarter from 1965.4 to 1997.4, yielding 129 target dates. The maximum lengths of the forecasts di¤er by target date. For example, for the early target dates, there were only 'current quarter'and one-quarter ahead forecasts. By the 1970's, the FED sta¤ was making forecasts four or more quarters ahead. Consequently, the number of observations is not identical for each horizon.
There is more than one forecast made during many of the quarters for a given 'target' -we take the latest forecasts made in the quarter as the forecasts for that quarter. We follow Joutz
Stekler (2000) in treating the forecasts made during the …rst few days of a quarter as belonging to the previous quarter, because little information would have accrued. Joutz Stekler (2000) analyse the relationships between the forecasts made at various times during the months. They …nd that forecasts made later in the quarter are more accurate for forecasts of the current quarter, but not subsequent quarters. We consider only one forecast a quarter as inter-quarter forecast changes would be expected to be more important than intra-quarter changes. By taking the last forecast in each quarter, we ensure that as far as possible the forecasts are made at approximately the same time in each quarter.
For much of our analysis, we consider forecasts of the quarters 1974:2 through to 1997:4 (so T = 95) as we have current (h = 1) to 4-quarter ahead forecasts (h = 5). Note that a current-quarter forecast is acually a 1-step forecast, as the current-quarter value is unknown when the forecast is made, a next-quarter forecast is a 2-period forecast, and so on up to h = 5.
Care need is required in distinguishing between step and quarter.
A possible complication is that the FED's forecasts are conditional on a counterfactual path for monetary policy (see, e.g., Reifschneider, Stockton and Wilcox (1997) ), whereby a more or less constant path is often assumed. Because policy is generally thought to a¤ect the economy with a lag, even though the FED conditions its forecasts on a counterfactual path it might be reasonable to assume that short horizon forecasts are essentially equivalent to unconditional forecasts, whilst longer-horizon forecasts would have a forecastable error component due to the di¤erence between the actual and assumed policy rates. For example, Romer Romer (2000, p.437) indicate that monetary policy has little impact on either real output or in ‡ation for at least 3 or 4 quarters. Our maximum horizon is four quarters ahead. To the extent that policy has a signi…cant e¤ect on the macroeconomy within this timeframe, our longer horizon forecasts may exhibit systematic biases for this reason.
The actual values used for the construction of forecast errors are taken to be the 45-day release numbers from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and the …rst published unemployment …gures released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). It is sometimes argued that forecasters seek to forecast earlier announcements of data rather than later revisions (see e.g.,
Keane Runkle (1990) ). This position appears to be consistent with the literature on the e¤ects of data vintage on model speci…cation, estimation, and forecast evaluation: see Stark (2001, 2003) and Koenig, Dolmas and Piger (2003) .
Forecast bias results

Biases by horizon, tested separately
We …rst test the 1 through 5-step ahead forecasts separately for bias, by regressing the forecast errors on a constant and testing whether the coe¢ cient on the constant is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, as in standard analyses. In so doing we allow an MA(h 1) serially-correlated error process. For example, a 2-step forecast of 1998Q1 made in December 1997 will be made before the actual value for 1997Q4 is known, as the actual values are taken to be the 45-day release from the BEA. But 1-step (current quarter) forecasts are not serially correlated. For example, the actual data for 1997Q3 is known -having been published in November 1997 -before the current quarter forecast of 1997Q4 is made in December 1997.
In calculating autocorrelation-consistent standard errors we adopt uniform weights by horizon in the HAC standard errors of Newey and West (1987) . The results of doing so are recorded in Table 1 , where the calculations are based on the maximum number of forecasts available for each horizon (also recorded in the table). As a precursor to pooling over horizons, we also record the results of testing separately by horizon for a shorter period, 74.2 -97.4. This matches the sample of forecasts available for the pooling exercise, and so allows a direct comparison of the individual horizon and pooled results on a common sample period.
The results suggest little evidence that either the in ‡ation or the unemployment rate forecasts are biased at any horizon (using a 5% signi…cance level), while the 1-step real growth 1.37 and 1.12, compared to 1.24. The RMSEs for the more recent period are lower, but with the possible exception of in ‡ation, are not markedly so. We conclude from this that the assumption of homoscedastic shocks is not unreasonable.
Pooling over horizons
As well as testing the forecasts separately at each step ahead, we can 'pool over horizons' as discussed in section 2. As noted, the nature of the forecast data is such that the maximum forecast horizons for the earlier period are short. = 2 u 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
the table records only the estimate of the standard error of^ obtained from (15). As shown in Table 2 , omitting 2 " has virtually no e¤ect on inference concerning for either in ‡ation or growth. Whether we assume an indiosyncratic error component is immaterial for inference on bias. The OLS pooled estimates suggest the forecasts of all three variables are unbiased. Table 3 contains the results of testing when we allow the bias to vary across horizon. The results were obtained using equation (8). The table contains results when idiosyncratic shocks are either present or absent. If there are idiosyncratic shocks, we can accept the null hypothesis of a common bias at all horizons for in ‡ation and real growth, but not for unemployment.
However, if the null hypothesis is that the common bias is zero, then we reject the null for all three series. In the absence of idiosyncratic shocks, we reject both hypotheses: the null of a common bias and that it is equal to zero. Tables 2 and 3 indicate that whether we enforce a common bias across horizons in the maintained model is crucial. The forecasts for all three variables are biased when we jointly test that all the horizon-speci…c bias terms are zero. Given that we …nd signi…cant biases, it is of interest to consider these a little more carefully. At the longer horizons, we …nd over-predictions (negative biases) for both unemployment and output growth, as well as for in ‡ation for the 1974-97 period (except for h = 5). Although both unemployment and output growth are over-predicted, further investigation revealed that the forecasts errors are signi…cantly negatively correlated at all steps other than h = 1, which is what one might expect to …nd. The in ‡ation and output growth errors are also signi…cantly negatively correlated.
The results in
The correlations between the in ‡ation and unemployment forecast errors are insigni…cant at all horizons. Table 4 records the results of testing the revisions separately, as in equation (18), for example. This is the more traditional approach to analysing forecast revisions. The …rst part of the table reports the results of tests for dependence in four revisions series; r t;h;h+1 , for h = 1; : : : ; 4. We test whether the revision to one target period helps predict the same horizon revision to the subsequent target period. There is evidence of smoothing of revisions for in ‡ation at horizons h = 2; 4. There is no evidence of smoothing of the output growth and unemployment forecasts.
Forecast revisions results
The bottom panel of Table 4 shows the results of testing for dependence in revisions to the same target. We …nd that the revisions between the 3 and 2-step forecasts of in ‡ation are predictable from the change between the 5 and 4-step forecasts -is found to be signi…cantly positive so that changes appear to be implemented gradually. This implies if upward revisions have been made, the revision to the 3-step ahead forecast for the same target is also likely to be positive. Otherwise there is no evidence of ine¢ ciency. We suspect this re ‡ects the systematic errors in forecasting in ‡ation in the later half of the 1970s and …rst half of the 1980s. There were under-predictions of in ‡ation in the 1970s, and the over-predictions in the 1980s, even as the Federal Reserve was attempting to establish low in ‡ation credibility. In addition, there were persistent fears of in ‡ation accelerating in the 1990s.
The results for the tests of …rst-order correlation in the stacked revisions (see section 3) are summarised in Table 5 , where we again present two sets of results. The …rst two rows relate to regressing r t;i;j on r t 1;i;j , the last two rows look at revisions for the same target t. The estimates of 2 " and 2 u from testing for bias are used to calculate E (rr 0 ) to test = 0 in rows (1) and (3). Rows (2) and (4) assume 2 " = 0 and form E (rr 0 ) from 2 u . The evidence in the …rst part of the table suggests that revisions are predictable for in ‡ation, and possibly for growth, but not for unemployment. The …nal rows report the pooled tests of whether revisions are predictable from earlier revisions of the same target. Our results suggest there is no smoothing in the forecast revisions of this sort. These are the more standard tests of forecast revisions akin to Nordhaus (1987) , but as noted, we do not consider adjacent revisions.
Using the stacked and separate regression approaches, and the two di¤erent information sets, we …nd some evidence that the revisions of the in ‡ation forecasts are predictable. This indicates that the forecasts were not rational. In particular, changes were smoothed over the 1974.2-1997.4 sample period. These results complement those of Scotese (1994) who found some evidence of smoothing in the FED forecasts of real GNP for some periods. She had based her …ndings on a comparison of the FED forecasts with those of a benchmark, a BVAR. Our analysis does not require any benchmark and is based solely on an examination of the forecasts, their errors and revisions.
Conclusions
We have analyzed the FED Greenbook forecasts to determine whether they are unbiased, and rational, as measured by the predictability of the forecast revisions. The forecasts were analyzed in two ways: separately at each horizon, and pooled across horizons. Pooling has a number of advantages in terms of e¢ ciency. Our results di¤er from those of the traditional approach that tests for forecast bias separately at each horizon. In our case the traditional approach does not reject unbiasedness. The results of our pooling approach (allowing horizon-speci…c biases) indicated that the forecasts of all three variables are biased.
We identify two forms of smoothing of forecast revisions. The …rst concerns revisions to the same target, as discussed by Nordhaus (1987) . We found forecast smoothing of this sort for in ‡ation based on the individual regressions. While the reasons why the forecasts are smoothed is beyond the scope of this paper, a conjecture that would apply to smoothing of revisions of forecasts of the same target is the following. Scotese had suggested that the FED forecasters wanted to maintain their "reputation" as well as be accurate. We can provide one possible reason why "reputation," interpreted to mean credibility, is important to the FED sta¤. Since FED policy cannot oscillate between stimulative and contractionary actions, the forecasts must be credible to form the basis for policy decisions. If there were large ‡uctuations in the forecasts from FOMC meeting to meeting, the forecasters would lose some of their credibility with the Board members and Bank Presidents. Consequently, when there is uncertainty and the sta¤ receives data that tend to be volatile (and subject to revision), the sta¤ may only partially revise its previous forecast. This avoids the problem of having to reverse the changes incorporated into the new forecast if later data partially reverse the earlier movements. If the later data corroborate the earlier numbers, the next revision will be in the same direction as the previous revision. This may explain why the forecasts have been smoothed and why the revisions in the FED forecasts have been predictable. 7 There was stronger evidence of serial correlation in revisions across adjacent targets for in ‡ation from the pooled approach. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the …rst study to address this issue. Our …ndings imply that if the revision between the j and j 1 horizon forecasts of period t is positive, then the likelihood is that the revision between the j and j 1 horizon forecasts of period t + 1 will also be positive. We leave further exploration of this topic to future research.
Letters 21: 45-48. The test for bias regresses the forecast errors on a constant, and records the p-value (columns 3 and 6) of the t-statistic. The p-value is the probability of observing a value in excess of the (squared) t-test statistic if the null is true. The last column reports RMSFEs. All inference based on OLS. Rows 1 and 3 use the estimates of 2 u and 2 " obtained when testing for bias. Rows 2 and 4 use the estimate for 2 u when 2 " is set to zero when testing for bias.
